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New Member States in the EU: From Listening to Action?

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The unprecedented enlargement of the European Union to ten new countries on 1 May 2004 and the subsequent rejection of the EU Constitution and difficult ratification of the Lisbon Treaty opened up questions about the future functioning of the European Union. (Some) politicians and scholars argue Eastern enlargement influenced the nature of the EU in fundamental ways and restricted the potential for the deepening of integration. Is that true? Examination of new member states' preferences can help to answer this question.

1. Research Design

Research Goals

1. To identify national preferences and strategies of the new member states (NMS) from Central and Eastern Europe. Preferences are defined as the 'fundamental motivations underlying support or opposition' to further integration.¹ States 'develop strategies and bargain with one another' to realize their 'preferences more efficiently than do unilateral actions.'²
2. To identify policy areas in which the NMS either support further integration and are willing to pool their sovereignty the EU or tend to support intergovernmental modes of decision-making or prefer to keep the full control over their interests.
3. To determine factors those condition the priorities and the behaviour of new EU member states.

Methodology

1. Content analysis of official documents and the media to identify the most important priorities in the context of three formative events:
 - EU accession talks (1998-2002);
 - the Convention on the Future of Europe (Convention);
 - the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC).
2. Semi-structured interviews with representatives of the NMS, EU institutions and 'old' member states.
3. An expert survey.
4. Patterns of voting in the Council.

1 Moravcsik, Andrew. 1999. *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. London: Routledge/UCL Press. p. 5.

2 Ibid, p. 20.

2. Research Findings

Political Culture and Style of New EU Member States

- Overwhelming **general pro-integration political culture** in the NMS is mostly resulting from the accession process. They define themselves as supporters of the community method being mostly small member states.
- A statistically significant relationship was found between the size of the country and the benefits its voters perceive for their country from EU membership. **Citizens in smaller countries more believe in the benefits of EU membership** than do citizens of larger countries.
- Despite the strong general support for integration, the majority of NMS have **reservations about the deepening of integration** in the area of social policies, tax harmonization, some aspects of justice and home affairs or education, culture or ethics.
- Being a **small** member state and the experience with 'limited sovereignty' under the Soviet domination are used as arguments against the further integration.
- NMS mostly pursue a **reactive political style**. The research examined salience of the three types of strategies defined by T. Börzel³:
 - Very rare **pace-setting**: the main example is Eastern Partnership; others (e.g. the Nuclear Forum) are still evolving.

"[The EU] is such a complex and fluid system that even older member states do not come with new initiatives as used to be the case" (EUIN-08-05).
 - Rare cases of **foot-dragging**: the statistics do not show any excesses in the use of veto, yet some NMS (e.g. Poland, Lithuania) enjoy the veto power *per se*:

"You know, they like the fact that they can block as well" (EXP-08-06).
 - Most common strategy **fence-sitting**:

"Certainly, they [NMS] do not try to play alliance games if they do not have specific interests at stake. They do not want to be used in some alliances. I personally see it as a necessity that when you do not have something at stake, you try to behave neutrally and not engage in playing games." (EXP-08-01).

³ Börzel, Tanja. 2002. Pace Setting, Foot Dragging and Fence Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization. In: Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 193-214.

- Political **style of communication** is mostly perceived as modest.

The NMS and Lisbon Treaty

- The **dependency of the NMS on EU structural funds** matters. The majority of the NMS clearly articulated that their support for the Lisbon Treaty was conditional on negotiations regarding the EU's financial perspective.
- In nearly half of the CEE members there was cross-party unanimous support for the Lisbon Treaty (LT). Such a consensus was rare in the old EU-15 (Luxembourg and Italy being possible exceptions).
- **Ideology and personal political ambitions/style** also matter – opposition to the Lisbon Treaty (LT) in CEE comes from the mainstream centre-right parties and leading political figures (presidents).
- While in the old EU members party-based opposition comes disproportionately from the fringe parties (extreme right and extreme left) located at the periphery of national political systems, opposition to the EU in CEE is as likely to come from **the fringe parties as it is from the established mainstream parties** (e.g. Christian Democrats-KDH in Slovakia, Civic Democrats-ODS in the Czech Republic and Law and Justice in Poland).
- Poland and the Czech Republic have had **divided political elite over the Treaty**. In both cases a minority faction within the main conservative party supported by the head of state opposed ratification. Both presidents exerted a significant impact on the ratification; the Czech president's demands even brought a last-minute opt-out from the Charter of Rights and Freedoms for the Czech Republic.

Decision-making in the Council

- The average support for the Council decisions by all 27 EU member states was 93.7 per cent (calculated only on the basis of those instances of voting when at least one member state did not support the measure, i.e. excluded were those meetings where unanimous support was reached).
- Among the new EU member states, only two (Poland and Lithuania) “scored” below the average of the EU-27.
- Among the old 15 EU member states, ten “scored” below the EU average. Member states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) tend to be more supportive of the Council decisions than are the old EU-15 countries.

Administrative Capacity, Coordination and NMS' Preferences

- **Absorbing membership and learning.** The respondents refer to the “initial shock after the accession” and agree that a country’s ability to act in the EU improves gradually in direct proportion to the increasing period of membership. The main catalyst of the learning process is the EU presidency:

“It is something that sets things in motion” (NCS-09-37).

- **Prioritization** as the main counterstrategy to solve the limited administrative capacity that is determined the size of the country.

“We should be realistic and concentrate on the most important issues, so it is the question of flexibility. We are trying to be flexible” (NCS-08-25).

- **Insufficient stability** of national administrations, especially at the level of bureaucratic apparatus:

“One of the key factors is a high employee turnover rate at national ministries. At one moment you cooperate with Mr X and Mrs Y, and a month later Mr W and Mrs B appear, very young, brand new, and you can start afresh with their institutionalization” (EUIN-09-12).

- **Insufficient representation** of NMS in the European institutions. It undermines the ability to upload their proposals and preferences to the EU level:

“We still have only a small number of people working in the European institutions. Since these are the people who know the functioning of the Union and the inner processes, they could advise us, help us. And I am not talking about some sort of confidential information. They just could tell us how it works. This is a huge disadvantage compared to the countries with much longer experience with membership” (NCS-09-39).

- NMS often do not understand importance of **the representation in the European institutions for effective pursuing their national preferences:**

“By filling every job vacancy available, whether in the Commission or at the Secretariat, they actually pursue their national perception... I think we still don’t realize that it is a strong instrument for influencing policy-making” (NCS-08-21).

- The NMS representatives express their **dissatisfaction with the change of recruitment policy in the EU institutions:**

“[Since] we joined the EU, the rules of recruitment have changed. I have heard from many that it was not pointed against new member states, but no one believes it. The fact is that the staff policy has changed. Whatever they say, I know that it was because of new member states”. (EUIN-08-07)

- **The (in)effectiveness of domestic coordination mechanisms.** The weak ability of NMS to prepare national positions within an appropriate time undermines effective work of their representatives in working groups and COREPER.

[The NMS have] “difficulties developing clear instructions, understanding the importance of discussed matters, creating sufficient time for discussion at national level and defining their positions” (EUIIN-08-02).

NMS’ Preferences and Strategies in Foreign and Security Policy

- We have identified **three distinct security priorities** that are common to the NMS with varying degrees of intensity:
 - **Energy security.** The NMS are concerned with independent, sufficient and steady supplies of energy and as a result support greater cooperation and possibly integration in energy policy at the EU level.
 - **Transatlantic relations** represent the second distinct security interest pursued by the NMS, though there is a varying degree of emphasis on the importance of transatlantic ties. While all the NMS claim that relations with the U.S. are vital, they represent an utmost priority especially for the Baltic states due to their negative Soviet-era experience.
 - **Enlargement** is the third distinct policy interest for the NMS. However, the positions of the NMS toward further enlargement have shifted over time.
- The NMS foreign policy interests are **quite clearly geographically confined**:
 - The NMS largely concentrate on ties with immediate neighbours or regions and the two clear geographic priorities are **the eastern neighbours of the EU and the countries of the Western Balkans**.
 - The intensity of geographic preferences has to do with historical territories that include parts of today’s EU neighbours once inside the former NMS state structures (Western Ukraine vis-à-vis Poland, Belarus vis-à-vis Lithuania).
 - For some of the NMS relations with particular eastern neighbours are of absolutely vital importance. This goes especially for **the Baltic states**, whose relations with Russia are a crucial priority.
 - The case of **the Visegrad countries and Slovenia** is a bit more diverse due to the differing historical legacies of Russia and also due to the differing degrees to which energy supplies depend on geographical proximity to the EU’s eastern neighbours.
 - Although all the NMS declare the importance of relations with countries of the Western Balkans, these relations are highest on the list of priorities for **Slovenia and Hungary**, two immediate

geographic neighbours of these ex-Yugoslav aspirants to EU membership.

- The one exception to the focus on immediate neighbours is **Afghanistan**. The NMS have justified their interest in Afghanistan as paying attention to an important global issue that is relevant to the EU as a whole.
- The attitudes of the NMS to the institutional makeup of the CFSP and ESDP are indicative of a **general preference for the institutional status quo** rather than major changes.
 - Preference for **the inter-governmental mode of decision-making in CFSP**. According to one representative, the member states should have *“the last and decisive word” (NCS-08-10)*. Even those NMS generally more willing and open to more integration declare readiness for “more cooperation” rather than integration. Most NMS did not initially support the creation of an EU foreign minister in the EU Constitution or the EU representative for foreign and security policy in the Lisbon Treaty.
 - The NMS still focus on **adapting to existing decision-making rules** in the CFSP and ESDP, therefore are hesitant about institutional reform in foreign policy. Their ability to get its foreign policy priorities through to the EU and then implement them in the EU has been constrained by:
 - inadequate representation of the NMS in EU institutions;
 - difficulties in communication between permanent representations and national capitals due to technical and organizational deficiencies in exchanging classified data;
 - an ongoing learning process in the functioning of EU institutions. (NCS-08-21)
- These most distinct foreign and security policy **preferences are shaped by the Cold War legacy, structural dependencies, and by the geography of the historical statehood of the individual NMS**. While the Cold War legacy makes the NMS cling to NATO, structural dependencies on Russia make the NMS keen to push for more cooperation and integration in EU energy policy and energy security.

NMS' Preferences and Strategies in Energy Policy and Security

- The most important energy sources in NMS are natural gas and nuclear energy and the main concern is the security of supplies. Several main preferences of NMS can be distinguished:
 - NMS **support further integration in the energy sector** and emphasize its **external dimension**:

“Integration should be much deeper in fields of energy supply, security... Also, the EU should be more unified when it comes to EU external, energy and economic policies” (NCS-09-48).

- NMS want to keep decisions about their **energy mix at the domestic level**. Decision-making on the energy mix is important not only for countries interested in nuclear power but also for those producing electricity in coal-fired power plants (i.e. Poland).

“It is clear that Slovakia will not give up nuclear energy and will insist that the Commission has nothing to say on how we mix our energy sector. So the energy mix is our own decision” (EUIIN-08-11).

- **Diversification of energy resources and transit routes** is one of the key preferences of NMS:

“For new member states [energy] was a little bit of an issue [but] it has become a really huge issue right now, the dependence on the Russian supply of oil and gas is enormous” (EXP-08-02).

However they lack necessary resources therefore they tend to push this issue on the EU level.

- NMS advocate **solidarity among member states** in the energy field:

“Having quite a bad experience recently, we are very much in favour if the EU would try to create a real common energy policy based on equal treatment of every partner and based on solidarity. It means that energy supply is a common interest, and if a single member state would have a problem with the supply of energy, other member states should be ready to help this country” (NCS-09-38).

- In the energy security issue the NMS consider themselves as **agenda setters - the solidarity provision** in the Lisbon Treaty and the initiation of **the European Nuclear Energy Forum**:

“On the Lisbon Treaty, there was the same important element on energy policy; we were quite active in adding solidarity provisions into the new Lisbon Treaty” (NCS-08-26).

“Also neighbouring countries, Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states, are interested in energy security. But we differentiate from the context of new member countries in the nuclear area. We have a nuclear forum...we have to start the discussion and try to propose some European rules in this area” (NCS-08-20).

- The NMS’ priorities in energy security are mostly shaped by **structural dependencies and** by accession legacy (institutional learning). The 2009 gas crisis revealed these structural weaknesses and placed energy security to top priorities in the EU. NMS therefore prefer the EU level to the national level for managing energy security topics because:

- NMS are dependent on Russian supplies; they are in an asymmetrical position to Russia. NMS have doubts about their ability to successfully negotiate with Russia and they want the EU to speak for them:

“It is important for us that our problem with Russia or some countries’ problem with Russia can be solved better at the EU level, not through the individual bilateral relations with these countries” (NCS- 09-40).

- Most NMS lack domestic resources. The economies of NMS are thus dependent on energy imports, mostly from Russia and cannot rely upon domestic stock.
- Accession negotiations have taught NMS to follow EU recommendations and rules without having the right to influence the process. Lacking these guidelines, NMS are not able to deal with energy security issues that are not covered by EU rules and thus they call for the uploading of this agenda to the EU level.

NMS’ Timing of Euro-zone Entry

- Global economic crisis **complicated and changed timing** of accession the Euro-zone:

“At the beginning of the decade, we took the question of the Euro more as an automatic matter, easier than it appears to be now.” (NCS-08-25).

Given different economic and political factors we have identified three types of new member states’ strategies:

- **Red Riding Hoods** (Slovenia, Slovakia, and Estonia) – thanks to the political consensus placed Euro-zone entry as their top priority and chose the correct economic policy mix to fulfil the criteria.
 - **Sleeping Beauties** (Czech Republic and to a certain date Poland) – remain indifferent to the EMU entry, prefer flexibility over stability and have decided to wait for better times.
 - **Cinderellas** (Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania) – are constrained by their economic performance that limit credibility of their political commitments.
- Differences in preferences can be explained by:
 - The **economic diversity** of the countries; the economic policy mix results in different outcomes in terms of inflation, real convergence, public finances, thus providing a window of opportunity, or constraints, for the decision of political elites.
 - **Different patterns of monetary and fiscal policies** in NMS are also projected in the strategic decisions of their political elites. The tradition of monetary policies backed with the durability of the institutions - namely the

central banks - creates various levels of attachment to the national currency and attributes it the status of a national symbol.

- **The absence of templates** in the accession process has shifted the responsibility for accession process outcomes to the member states.
- **The ambivalent attitude of EU institutions.** Unlike in previous cases (most notably EU and Schengen accession), where the Commission was quite active, EMU entry does not represent a vital interest for the EU or the EU institutions:

“The approach of the EU institutions has been very correct and professional, but also extremely strict” (VIS-03-01).

- The diversity in economic performance causes unique **dilemmas** framed by various economic policy constraints. Cooperation between the candidate states has been mostly limited to the technical aspect of their EMU accession. They share their experience from the communication campaign or the changeover period, however there is little cooperation in discussing an ‘ideal policy mix’. They all agree on the necessity of exchanging information, and as such countries like Slovenia and Slovakia are among those with whom most countries wish to exchange information and experience:

“There has not been that much cooperation. It has been more of a race than cooperation. There was a sort of beauty contest to be the first one in” (EUIN 09-14).

We identified four different dilemmas posed for the countries, enhancing the complexity of the EMU accession process:

- **High growth and low inflation:**

“It is economic reality [that] if you have as we had more than 10% growth, you have higher inflation - that is absolutely clear. So that was the choice between growth and the Euro” (NCS-08-25).

- **Flexibility and stability**, more precisely the use of abandoning the instrument of monetary policy. Romania and Visegrad countries opted for some variation of a floating regime, while the Baltic States and Bulgaria chose a fixed exchange rate.
- **Reforms** necessary to be implemented, mostly in the pension system and public finance system and the apparent **low popularity** of such measures.
- Euro has been losing its **charisma** among public and political elite in the NMS (with the exception of Romania), and the “bad times” for the Euro-zone have accentuated this phenomenon even more.

3. Recommendations

- **To improve domestic administrative capacity and coordination:**
 - Define a comprehensive set of national preferences that is followed by all national agencies and is used as a “checklist” when dealing with respective proposals. This enables the country to centralize its capacity into areas regarded by national governments as the most important ones.
 - Preserve/create/re-establish special mechanisms of remuneration for the administration engaged in European matters. The high turnover of administrative capacities, especially at the domestic level of coordination mechanisms, reduces the possibility of social learning and affects the ability of new member states to pursue their priorities within working groups. The more stable the staff of national administration dealing with European matters at the national level, the stronger is the probability that the administration will be able to effectively identify, formulate and pursue national priorities in the EU.
 - Considerable and coordinated efforts have to be made in NMS to address their lack of representation in EU institutions from the willingness of national governments to invest into human resources on a European level to coordinated political and diplomatic efforts: In other words, fill every job vacancy available for the country even if the position is financed by the NMS.
 - Strengthen administrative capacity at permanent representations and their formal role in the national coordination systems in EU matters - they are already among the most important players when it comes to the daily functioning of domestic systems of coordination in EU matters.

- **To improve coordination with members states and coalition building abilities:**
 - Use the experience of other countries in preparations for the presidency; ensure that extra staff capacity created for the presidency is preserved afterwards.
 - To upload national preferences requires better coordination with the Commission and ‘old’ member states. Share the experiences from successful cases of such cooperation.
 - Share the experience of other countries in preparations for Euro-zone entry.

4. Tables

Table1: Level of Support for Council of Ministers Decisions, (May) 2004-2009

Notes: The table contains the data on all Council of Ministers voting by the QMV. Number of Council votes: 51 (2004), 102 (2005), 78 (2006), 77 (2007), 147 (2008), 150 (2009)

	UK	FR	DE	HOL	LUX	BEL	SPA	ITA	AUT	SVE	FIN	DAN	GRE	POR	IRE	SVK	CZ	HUN	POL	SLO	LAT	LIT	EST	CYP	MAL	BUL	ROM
2004	98.0	98.0	98.0	98.0	99.0	100.0	99.0	97.1	96.1	95.1	98.0	96.1	95.1	98.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.0	100.0	99.0	96.1	99.0	100.0	98.0		
2005	96.1	96.1	96.1	93.1	99.5	97.5	97.1	91.7	98.5	87.7	92.6	88.2	92.6	90.2	98.5	98	96.1	97.1	96.1	97.5	98	94.1	97.5	99.5	96.1		
2006	86.5	98.7	92.3	87.2	98.7	91.7	96.8	97.4	96.2	84.6	92.9	89.7	96.2	96.2	95.5	97.4	94.2	96.8	89.7	98.1	93.6	90.4	94.2	97.4	96.8		
2007	96.1	100.0	99.4	98.7	98.7	99.4	99.4	98.7	100.0	96.8	98.7	96.4	99.4	99.4	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	97.4	100.0	99.4	99.4	99.4	100.0	98.7	100.0	100.0
2008	98.9	99.7	99.3	99.3	98.0	98.0	99.0	99.3	98.6	99.7	99.7	99.3	99.0	98.6	99.0	100.0	99.7	99.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.3	98.3	99.7	99.7
2009	98.3	100.0	95.7	99.0	99.3	100.0	99.7	100.0	97.7	99.0	99.3	96.2	99.7	99.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.3	100.0	99.7

Table 2: Level of Support for Council of Ministers Decisions on Disputed Measures, 2004-2009

	UK	FR	DE	HOL	LUX	BEL	SPA	ITA	AUT	SVE	FIN	DAN	GRE	POR	IRE	SVK	CZ	HUN	POL	SLO	LAT	LIT	EST	CYP	MAL	BUL	ROM
2004	91.7	91.7	91.7	91.7	95.8	100.0	95.8	87.5	83.3	79.2	91.7	83.3	79.2	91.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	95.8	100.0	95.8	83.3	95.8	100.0	91.7		
2005	92.2	92.2	92.2	86.3	99.0	95.1	94.1	83.3	97.1	75.5	85.3	76.5	85.3	80.4	97.1	96.1	92.2	94.1	86.3	95.1	96.1	88.2	95.1	99.0	92.2		
2006	79.4	98.0	88.2	80.4	98.0	89.2	95.1	96.1	94.1	76.5	89.2	84.3	94.1	94.1	93.1	96.1	91.2	95.1	84.3	97.1	90.2	85.3	91.2	96.1	95.1		
2007	85.7	100.0	97.7	95.5	95.5	97.7	97.7	95.5	100.0	88.6	95.5	82.1	97.7	97.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	90.9	100.0	97.7	97.7	97.7	100.0	95.5	100.0	100.0
2008	92.9	98.1	96.3	96.3	88.9	88.9	94.4	96.3	92.6	98.1	98.1	95.2	94.4	94.4	92.9	100.0	98.1	94.4	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	96.3	90.7	98.1	98.1
2009	88.6	100.0	74.0	94.0	96.0	100.0	98.0	100.0	86.0	94.0	96.0	97.5	98.0	98.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	96.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	96.0	100.0	98.0

Notes: The table includes only instances where at least one EU member state voted against or abstained. Number of Council votes: 25 (2009), 27 (2008), 22 (2007), 51 (2006), 51 (2005), 12 (5/2004)

Table 3: Level of Support over the whole 2004-2009 Period (disputed measures)

	UK	FR	DE	HOL	LUX	BEL	SPA	ITA	AUT	SVE	FIN	DAN	GRE	POR	IRE	SVK	CZ	HUN	POL	SLO	LAT	LIT	EST	CYP	MAL	BUL	ROM
2004-09	87.9	97.1	90.4	89.0	96.8	94.4	96.0	93.0	94.1	83.7	91.7	85.1	92.2	91.4	91.7	98.4	95.7	96.8	91.2	98.4	95.7	92.0	96.3	98.7	94.1	99.3	98.6

Table 4: List of Conducted Interviews

Code	Respondent	Date	Place
NCS-08-01	Representative of new EU member state	11.6.2008	Brussels
EXP-08-01	Expert	12.6.2008	Brussels
EXP-08-02	Expert	12.6.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-02	Representative of new EU member state	13.6.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-03	Representative of new EU member state	30.9.2008	Brussels
EXP-08-03	Expert	1.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-04	Representative of new EU member state	1.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-05	Representative of new EU member state	2.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-06	Representative of new EU member state	2.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-07	Representative of new EU member state	2.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-08	Representative of new EU member state	2.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-09	Representative of new EU member state	7.10.2008	Brussels
EUIN-08-01	Representative of EU institution	7.10.2008	Brussels
EUIN-08-02	Representative of EU institution	7.10.2008	Brussels
EUIN-08-03	Representative of EU institution	7.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-10	Representative of new EU member state	7.10.2008	Brussels
EUIN-08-04	Representative of EU institution	7.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-11	Representative of new EU member state	8.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-12	Representative of new EU member state	8.10.2008	Brussels
EUIN-08-05	Representative of EU institution	8.10.2008	Brussels
EUIN-08-06	Representative of EU institution	8.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-13	Representative of new EU member state	8.10.2008	Brussels
EXP-08-04	Expert	8.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-14	Representative of new EU member state	9.10.2008	Brussels
EXP-08-05	Expert	9.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-15	Representative of new EU member state	9.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-16	Representative of new EU member state	10.10.2008	Brussels
EUIN-08-07	Representative of EU institution	14.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-17	Representative of new EU member state	15.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-18	Representative of new EU member state	15.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-19	Representative of new EU member state	16.10.2008	Brussels
EXP-08-06	Expert	16.10.2008	Brussels
EUIN-08-08	Representative of EU institution	16.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-20	Representative of new EU member state	16.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-21	Representative of new EU member state	16.10.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-22	Representative of new EU member state	1.12.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-23	Representative of new EU member state	2.12.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-24	Representative of new EU member state	3.12.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-25	Representative of new EU member state	3.12.2008	Brussels
EUIN-08-09	Representative of EU institution	4.12.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-26	Representative of new EU member state	1.12.2008	Brussels
EUIN-08-10	Representative of EU institution	2.12.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-27	Representative of new EU member state	2.12.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-28	Representative of new EU member state	3.12.2008	Brussels
NCS-08-29	Representative of new EU member state	4.12.2008	Brussels
NCS-09-30	Representative of new EU member state	9.3.2009	Brussels
NCS-09-31	Representative of new EU member state	9.3.2009	Brussels
NCS-09-32	Representative of new EU member state	9.3.2009	Brussels
NCS-09-33	Representative of new EU member state	10.3.2009	Brussels
EUIN-09-11	Representative of EU institution	10.3.2009	Brussels
NCS-09-34	Representative of new EU member state	10.3.2009	Brussels
NCS-09-35	Representative of new EU member state	10.3.2009	Brussels
EUIN-09-12	Representative of EU institution	10.3.2009	Brussels
EUIN-09-13	Representative of EU institution	10.3.2009	Brussels
NCS-09-36	Representative of new EU member state	10.3.2009	Brussels
NCS-09-37	Representative of new EU member state	11.3.2009	Brussels
NCS-09-38	Representative of new EU member state	11.3.2009	Brussels
EUIN-09-14	Representative of EU institution	11.3.2009	Brussels
NCS-09-39	Representative of new EU member state	11.3.2009	Brussels

NCS-09-40	Representative of new EU member state	11.3.2009	Brussels
NCS-09-41	Representative of new EU member state	11.3.2009	Brussels
NCS-09-42	Representative of new EU member state	12.3.2009	Brussels
NCS-09-43	Representative of new EU member state	12.3.2009	Brussels
NCS-09-44	Representative of new EU member state	12.3.2009	Brussels
EXP-09-07	Expert	5.3.2009	Tallinn
NCS-09-45	Representative of new EU member state	19.3.2009	Vilnius
NCS-09-46	Representative of new EU member state	18.3.2009	Riga
NCS-09-47	Representative of new EU member state	12.3.2009	Tallinn
NCS-09-48	Representative of new EU member state	20.3.2009	Vilnius
NCS-10-49	Representative of new EU member state	25.2.2010	Brussels
NCS-10-50	Representative of new EU member state	26.2.2010	Brussels
VIS-01-01	Expert	8.10.2008	Brussels
VIS-01-02	Expert	16.10.2008	Budapest
VIS-01-03	Expert	17.10.2008	Budapest
VIS-01-04	Representative of new EU member state	16.10.2008	Budapest
VIS-01-05	Expert	17.10.2008	Budapest
VIS-01-06	Expert	17.10.2008	Budapest
VIS-01-07	Expert	16.10.2008	Budapest
VIS-01-08	Expert	17.10.2008	Budapest
VIS-01-09	Expert	16.10.2008	Budapest
VIS-01-10	Expert	16.10.2008	Budapest
VIS-01-11	Expert	3.12. 2008	Brussels
VIS-02-01	Expert	22.10. 2008	Prague
VIS-02-02	Representative of new EU member state	22.10. 2008	Prague
VIS-02-03	Representative of new EU member state	23.10. 2008	Prague
VIS-02-04	Expert	23.10. 2008	Prague
VIS-02-05	Representative of new EU member state	23.10. 2008	Prague
VIS-02-06	Expert	23.10. 2008	Prague
VIS-02-07	Expert	23.10. 2008	Prague
VIS-02-08	Expert	24.10. 2008	Prague
VIS-02-09	Expert	23.10. 2008	Prague
VIS-02-10	Expert	22.10. 2008	Prague
VIS-02-11	Expert	23.10. 2008	Prague
VIS-02-12	Expert	24.10. 2008	Prague
VIS-02-13	Expert	23.10. 2008	Prague
VIS-03-01	Representative of new EU member state	5.12.2008	Bratislava
VIS-03-02	Expert	16.2.1009	Bratislava
VIS-03-03	Representative of new EU member state	27.2.2009	Bratislava
VIS-03-04	Expert	4.3.2009	Bratislava
VIS-03-05	Expert	17.3.2009	Bratislava
VIS-03-06	Expert	19.3.2009	Bratislava
VIS-03-07	Representative of new EU member state	1.4.2009	Bratislava
VIS-03-08	Expert	2.4.2009	Bratislava
VIS-03-09	Representative of new EU member state	7.4.2009	Bratislava
VIS-04-01	Representative of new EU member state	17.11.2008	Warsaw
VIS-04-02	Representative of new EU member state	19.11.2008	Warsaw
VIS-04-03	Representative of new EU member state	18.11.2008	Warsaw
VIS-04-04	Representative of new EU member state	18.11.2008	Warsaw
VIS-04-05	Expert	18.11.2008	Warsaw
VIS-04-06	Expert	19.11.2008	Warsaw
VIS-04-07	Expert	17.11.2008	Warsaw
VIS-04-08	Expert	19.11.2008	Warsaw

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